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H.R. 23: An Assault on Water Resource Conservation and 
California’s State Sovereignty  
Ross Middlemiss* 
“Whiskey is for drinking, water is for fighting over.” This observation, 
attributed to Mark Twain, appropriately describes the centuries old struggles 
surrounding water in California.  The allocation of water has influenced 
population growth, economic development, and environmental health in 
California.  The northern part of California—with plentiful watersheds fed by 
coastal precipitation and Sierra Nevada Snowmelt—is pitted against the 
arid, heavily populated southern portion of the state, a leading agricultural 
region.  Both the State Water Project (SWP) and the Central Valley Project 
(CVP) pump fresh water from the San Francisco Bay Delta (Delta), supplying 
drinking water for two-thirds of California residents and irrigating over seven 
million acres of agricultural land.1  Competition for Delta water resources 
has decreased wildlife habitat, threatened species extinction, increased the 
risk of levee failure, and degraded the dependability of the Delta as a 
reliable source of high quality water.2  
Policies directing the quantity and timing of water exported out of the 
delta draw fierce response from stakeholders on all sides of the debate.  
Multiple California agencies influence the regulation of water in the state 
while balancing the competing interests at play.  This balancing act is often 
complicated by jurisdictional issues that arise from the Federal 
Government’s operation of the CVP. The Bureau of Reclamation began 
construction of the CVP in 1937, completing a project that was previously 
initiated by the state but abandoned during the Great Depression.3  The CVP 
and SWP share storage and conveyance infrastructure, meaning that state 
and federal operations must be closely coordinated.4  California’s agriculture 
industry, worth nearly fifty billion dollars annually, is heavily dependent on 
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CVP and SWP deliveries.  Control of these vital water resources is a high 
priority for many state and federal politicians representing agricultural 
districts and constituencies.  It is no surprise then, that federal legislation 
often has far-reaching impacts on control over California water.  
Multiple federalism issues arise when the competing state and federal 
interests in California water management collide.  The Gaining 
Responsibility on Water Act (H.R. 23 or Act),5 now pending before the 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the U.S. Senate, has set a 
potential collision course.  The Act, sponsored by California Representative 
David Valadao, a Republican, passed in the House by a 230-190 vote on July 
12, 2017.6  The Act purports to provide drought relief while serving “other 
purposes,” such as managing water transfers via the CVP.7  Provisions of the 
bill raise significant questions as to their potential impact on California’s 
sovereign ability to regulate and control water resources within its 
boundaries, under both state and federal law.  The implications of the bill, 
as now written, can be analyzed through three “prisms” of U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent.  These analyses will address provisions that may displace 
California’s ability to enforce state water law, exempt federal actions from 
environmental review, and/or commandeer state entities in violation of state 
sovereignty.   
Any resulting conclusions or projections could provide insight into 
what a final draft might look like and its chances of being signed into law.  
This investigation will highlight the manner in which legislators use 
Supreme Court precedent in pursuit of a policy agenda.  This legislation 
demonstrates a clear preference for agricultural and water diverter interests 
in the California water allocation debate.  H.R. 23, in whatever form it may 
take, will almost certainly attempt to constrain California’s ability to manage 
its water resources in an environmentally protective manner. 
 
Preemption Framework Concerning State Water Law 
California v. U.S. is the seminal case regarding the joint obligations on 
federal and state government regulation of water allocation.8  The U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), in its operation of the CVP, sought a permit 
from the California State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) to 
construct the New Melones Dam and appropriate the subsequently 
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impounded water.9  The SWRCB conditioned the grant of the permit on, 
among other conditions, the USBR first showing firm commitments, or a 
specific plan, for where and how the impounded water would be used.10  The 
U.S. argued, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the state could not place 
conditions on water appropriation permits for USBR projects.11  At issue was 
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, which declared nothing in the Act 
would interfere with any state law “relating to the control, appropriation, 
use, or distribution of water used in irrigation.”12  The Court held that the 
SWRCB could place conditions on appropriation and distribution permits 
for USBR projects “which are not inconsistent with congressional provisions 
authorizing the project in question.”13  The Court later refined its holding, 
stating that “the [Interior] Secretary should follow state law in all respects 
not directly inconsistent with these [Congressional] directives.”14  This 
holding provided Congress with potentially broad authority to preempt state 
law governing water as long as Congress provided a clear directive to the 
relevant federal agency.  
Subsequent decisions must be analyzed to determine the extent of 
federal authority to preempt state water law.  In California v. F.E.R.C., the 
Court found that minimum flow rates established under Federal Power Act 
(“FPA”) authority preempted higher state-mandated flow rates.15  The Court 
held the “other uses” language in Section 27 of the FPA, the so-called 
“saving clause,” demonstrated congressional intent to provide exclusive 
regulatory authority to FERC regarding water uses that do not implicate 
proprietary rights:16  
 
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as affecting 
or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of 
the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, 
or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or 
other uses, or any vested right acquired therein.17  
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The Court relied on its interpretation in First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Co-op. v. 
Federal Power Commission, which distinguished Section 27 of the FPA’s 
regulation of “other uses” from Section 8 of the Reclamation Act’s “water 
used in irrigation.”18  The First Iowa Court held that Section 27 only protected 
from supersedure state laws commanding the control, use, appropriation, or 
distribution of water in irrigation.19  As such proprietary rights are based in 
state property law, the First Iowa Court found such rights to be saved from 
FPC preemption.20  Finding no reason to overturn its own statutory 
interpretation in First Iowa, the Court in California v. F.E.R.C. concluded the 
state minimum flow rates were not proprietary in nature, and thus fell 
outside of Section 27 protection as intended by Congress in drafting the 
FPA, and were preempted.21  
In holding the state minimum flow requirements were preempted by 
the FPA, California v. F.E.R.C. can be used to clarify the scope of the California 
v. U.S. decision.  Distinguishing Section 27 of the FPA and Section 8 of the 
Reclamation Act, the Court stated that the “FPA envisioned a considerably 
broader and more active federal oversight role in hydropower development 
than did the Reclamation Act.”22  If the FPA allows for less state authority, it 
follows that the Section 27 “saving clause” would represent the minimum 
amount of state authority reserved under Section 8 of the Reclamation Act.  
As the California v. U.S. Court construed Section 8 “in a manner more 
generous to the States’ regulatory powers than was First Iowa’s reading of § 
27,” it can therefore be understood that California laws regarding proprietary 
water rights are protected from preemption.23  Such an interpretation would 
only allow a “clear congressional directive” concerning reclamation projects 
like the CVP to supersede state laws regarding water allocation decisions.  
The California v. F.E.R.C. Court referenced a presumption against federal 
preemption in areas traditionally within states’ police powers.24  The extent 
by which state water allocation laws might be preempted will therefore turn 
on the clarity with which congressional purpose was subsequently 
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expressed, and the history of deference to state authority over such 
allocation.25  
Application of Preemption Framework to H.R. 23 
Whether provisions of H.R. 23 represent a “clear congressional 
directive” can be assessed using the preemption framework referenced 
above, established by California v. U.S. and its preceding cases.  Section 108 
provides in the “Congressional Direction” section that “The Central Valley 
Project and the State Water Project shall be operated pursuant to the water 
quality standards and operational constraints described in the ‘Principles for 
Agreement on the Bay-Delta Standards Between the State of California and 
the Federal Government’ dated December 15, 1994 . . .”26  The immediate use 
of the “Congressional Direction” language is striking in terms of an express 
congressional directive.  The section then identifies specific water quality 
standards (WQS) and operational processes by which the projects must 
operate.  The impact of this directive can be evaluated in two parts.  First, 
does a clear congressional directive apply to a purely state-run project such 
as the SWP?  Second, does the directive, as applied to the CVP, conflict with 
state laws concerning proprietary water rights? 
The Court in California v. U.S. focused its analysis exclusively on the 
controversy surrounding regulatory authority over the New Melones Dam, a 
federal reclamation project.27  In allowing California to impose conditions 
“not inconsistent with clear congressional directives respecting the project,” 
the Court referenced the extent to which a congressional directive might 
preempt state law.28  A clear congressional directive does not stand on its 
own, it must refer to the federal reclamation project at issue.29  The Court’s 
preemption framework is set within the context of the federal project in 
question.  There is no indication that the clear congressional directive 
overriding conflicting state law is meant to extend beyond the scope of the 
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project in question.  It is thus likely that the mandated WQS and operational 
processes of Section 108 of H.R. 23 are not applicable to the SWP as a clear 
congressional directive under California v. U.S.  
The impact of Section 108 on the CVP will turn on what aspects of 
California law are implicated by the directive.  As the CVP is a federal 
project, is it clearly the object of the directive, proving analogous to the facts 
of California v. U.S. wherein the federally controlled dam was in dispute.30  
The inquiry should focus on the water uses the directive was intended to 
affect.  If Section 108’s requirement to follow the 1994 Bay-Delta agreement 
pertains to allocation decisions, it is likely they will control.  Conversely, if 
the directive appears to implicate the proprietary water rights, there is an 
argument to be made that such rights are protected from preemption.  The 
Bay-Delta agreement sets out WQS that set the upper limit of exports as a 
percentage of Delta in-flow during different periods of the calendar year.31  
This section of the agreement concerns the allocation of water exports to the 
CVP; exactly the type of use the California v. U.S. Court concluded was in the 
scope of a clear congressional directive’s preemptive effect.32  The deliberate 
language of Section 108 belies Congressional intent to control in this area of 
operation.  The clear congressional directive applies to a federal project and 
the allocation and distribution of water therefrom.  It is likely that this 
provision of H.R. 23 will preempt inconsistent state law.  
Subsection (b) of Section 108 also raises preemption concerns and 
requires comparison to the facts of the California v. U.S. case.  This provision 
prohibits the state or any federal department from imposing any condition 
on any water right to protect any species that is affected by operations of the 
CVP or SWP.33  This section raises similar concerns to subsection (a) in that 
it directs the manner with which the State is to operate its own project.  
Beyond this initial issue, the prohibition of “any condition” poses an 
analytical challenge to the interpretation of California v. U.S.  The Court 
explicitly held that California could impose conditions on the Federal 
project as long as the conditions did not run afoul of a clear congressional 
directive.34  The conditions in California v. U.S., which restricted certain uses 
to protect fish and wildlife, bear similarity to the prohibited class of 
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conditions outlined in Section 108(b).35  Despite the similarity to the 
conditions the Court approved in relation to the New Melones project, H.R. 
23 provides a clear congressional directive that would likely preempt 
California’s ability to impose environmentally protective conditions on CVP 
operations.  A potential vulnerability of this provision concerns the scope of 
the water rights to which the conditions prohibition applies.  The language 
fails to distinguish between appropriative and proprietary water rights in its 
stipulation that State or Federal department shall not “impose on any water 
right obtained pursuant to State law.”36  As discussed above, there is a 
strong argument that proprietary rights remain in the control of State law 
regardless of a clear congressional directive.  If this were the case, the 
preemption provided by California v. U.S. would not apply.  
 
Nondiscretionary Actions Exempt from ESA Consultation 
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires a federal 
agency (“action agency”) to consult with agencies within the Department of 
Commerce or the Interior to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or 
carried out by such agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence 
of any endangered species or threatened species.”37  How a federal action is 
defined and the attendant discretion of the action agency factor into the 
analysis of whether consultation is required under the ESA.  This inquiry was 
central to the Court’s decision in National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, in which the issue of agency discretion was center stage.38  The Home 
Builders Court addressed the issue of whether consultation was required 
when the Section 7(a)(2) requirements seemed to conflict with statutory 
mandates of the Clean Water Act.39  The conflict concerned the transfer of 
NPDES authority from the EPA to State officials upon the state satisfying 
nine criteria demonstrating proper state authority to implement the 
program.40  The petitioners argued, and the Court agreed, that the ESA 
consultation and required no-jeopardy finding would constitute a tenth 
criteria, effecting an implied repeal of the CWA statutory mandate.41  The 
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EPA argued this transfer represented a federal action for which consultation 
was required under ESA Section 7(a)(2).  The Court held Section 7(a)(2) of 
the ESA only applied to discretionary agency actions, and not to non-
discretionary actions required by statute once “specified triggering events 
have occurred.”42  The court supported this interpretation on regulations 
implementing Section 7(a)(2) that read, “Section 7 and the requirements of 
this part apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal 
involvement or control.”43  Therefore, the Court concluded that the CWA 
mandated transfer of NPDES authority once the nine statutory factors were 
met, and that such a transfer of authority was not discretionary, and thus 
exempt from ESA consultation.44   
 In the aftermath of Home Builders, the critical determination is what 
constitutes a discretionary agency decision, and how specific a competing 
statutory mandate must be to exempt Section 7 consultation.  Shortly 
following the disposition of Home Builders, the Ninth Circuit shed light on 
when an agency decision is discretionary, “When an agency, acting in 
furtherance of a broad Congressional mandate, chooses a course of action 
which is not specifically mandated by Congress and which is not specifically 
necessitated by the broad mandate, that action is, by definition, 
discretionary and is thus subject to Section 7 consultation.”45  The Ninth 
Circuit declined to read Home Builders to “immunize discretionary agency 
actions simply because they are taken in pursuit of a nondiscretionary 
goal.”46  Under this interpretation, specific congressional mandates directing 
nondiscretionary actions would not require consultation, while an agency 
choosing specific actions to implement broad statutory goals would require 
a Section 7 no-jeopardy finding.47  Exemption from Section 7(a)(2) 
consultation will turn on the extent to which Congress has specified how the 
agency must fulfill its various obligations.48  
 
Application of nondiscretionary exemption to H.R. 23 
The discretionary authority of the Bureau of Reclamation and therefore 
its obligation to consult under ESA Section 7(a)(2) is challenged by 
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numerous sections of H.R. 23.  Section 103 requires the Secretary, upon 
request of the contractor, to “renew any existing long-term repayment or 
water service contract that provides for the delivery of water from the Central 
Valley Project for a period of 40 years.”49  The threshold inquiry is whether a 
contract renewal is an “agency action” within the scope of Section 7(a)(2) 
consultation.  “Agency action” has been defined broadly, such that 
negotiating and executing contracts is “agency action.”50  Water deliveries 
from the CVP have a direct impact on the amount of water that remains in 
the Delta and its tributaries, thus affecting habitat and species health.  A 
decision to renew such a contract for forty years would certainly affect the 
Delta Smelt.  Furthermore, this is not the first attempt to ensure the renewal 
of water delivery contracts free of Section 7 consultation.  In NRDC v. Jewell, 
the Ninth Circuit held that as the Bureau of Reclamation had “some 
discretion” in the decision to renew settlement contracts, Section 7 
consultation was required.51  At issue were forty-year settlement contracts 
pertaining to the CVP between the Bureau and senior rights holders.52  
NRDC contended that the Bureau was required to consult with FWS 
pursuant to Section 7 prior to renewing the contracts because of the 
potential impact to the Delta Smelt.53  The court, on rehearing en banc, 
reversed its prior decision, finding the Bureau was not so constrained by the 
settlement contract provisions such that it lacked all discretion to act for the 
protected species’ benefit.54  The requirement of consultation does not 
depend on the degree of discretion, but whether the agency has any 
discretion at all to act on behalf of species protection.55  This interpretation 
can be applied to Section 103’s mandated contract renewal to find how 
constraining it is of the Secretary’s discretion. 
The contracts at issue in NRDC v. Jewell contained provisions locking in 
quantities of water to be allocated for the duration of the contract and 
subsequent renewals.56  This was argued to constrain the Bureau’s ability to 
renegotiate new terms upon renewal, an argument ultimately dismissed by 
 
 49. H.R. 23 § 103(a). 
 50. NRDC v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998) citing 50 
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the court.57  In the case of H.R. 23, the provision explicitly requires renewal, 
but does preclude renegotiation.  Section 103(b) directs the contracts to be 
administered according to a 1956 Act that supports the Reclamation Act of 
1939; the cited statute does not appear to eliminate the Secretary’s 
discretion regarding renewal conditions.  As there appears to be “some 
discretion” remaining, the act of contract renewal would require Section 7 
consultation before being approved.58  
Section 304 presents another instance of potential exemption from 
ESA consultation. The provision directs the Secretary to allocate water to 
service contractors within the Sacramento River Watershed in compliance 
with minimum percentages of contract quantities based on the current water 
year classification and the preceding year’s classification.59  After four 
specific water-year-type minimum percentages are stipulated, subsection (e) 
provides a catch-all whereby, in all other years, contractors must not receive 
less than twice the allocations received by south-of-Delta CVP contractors.  
This provision provides specific instructions for the Secretary to meet the 
goal of delivering contracted CVP water.  Such detailed directives, while not 
as exacting as an exhaustive list of criteria as in Home Builders, do seem to 
represent a course of action specifically mandated by Congress, and thus 
exempt from the consultation requirement.  A counter argument could be 
made, relying on NRDC v. Jewell, that subsections (d) and (e) leave room for 
agency discretion because they set minimum delivery percentages below 
100 percent of the contracted amount.  When the correct combination of 
consecutive water years occurs, the Secretary may be positioned to decide 
how much water to allocate between the fifty percent and 100 percent of 
normal (subsection (d)), or what allotment to south-of-the-Delta contractors 
will allow the twice as much provision to be satisfied.  If these decisions, 
while minor, are viewed as meeting the “some discretion” threshold of NRDC 
v. Jewell, it would be sufficient to trigger the consultation requirement of 
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“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the People.”60  The Tenth Amendment firmly articulates the line between 
the federal government’s enumerated powers and those reserved to the 
state, such that “all is retained which has not been surrendered.”61  
Provisions of H.R. 23 raise concerns over the extent to which the Federal 
Government can control California’s activities.  The constitutionality of such 
provisions will be analyzed using anti-commandeering principles 
established by previous judicial interpretations.  
The Supreme Court endeavored to discern the proper division of 
authority between the federal government and the states in New York v. U.S.62  
New York challenged provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act (LRWAP) of 1985, claiming its sovereignty was infringed in 
violation of the Tenth Amendment.63  The Court held that the provision 
requiring the State to either take title and accept liability for waste, or 
regulate pursuant to Congress’ direction, was an untenable choice between 
two options that would both go beyond the federal government’s 
constitutional authority.64  In presenting the state with this choice, the Court 
held that the act of Congress had “crossed the line distinguishing 
encouragement from coercion,” as either action would “‘commandeer’ state 
governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes.”65  
The Court reasoned that when state conduct is commandeered, the 
electoral responsiveness of both state and federal officials is diminished.66  
Federal officials, responsible for locally unpopular legislation, can be 
insulated from political accountability while state officials, pressed into 
service of legislation they did not themselves create, bear the brunt of the 
electorate’s anger.67  This rationale is made keeping in mind the possibility 
of federal preemption of state law, but in this scenario, the federal decision 
is in full view of the public.68  In keeping with the ideas of federalism 
enshrined in the 10th Amendment, the power reserved to the people 
 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend X. 
 61. U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
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necessitates a local government that is responsive to local preferences, and 
these preferences should not be imposed without express constitutional 
authority.  
While finding the take-title provision a violation, the Court did identify 
two ways in which Congress’ actions were within its Constitutional authority.  
Congress’ authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses were held 
to support the LRWAP’s provision of financial incentive for state 
compliance.69  Additionally, when exerting Commerce Clause authority over 
private individuals, Congress may offer states a choice between regulating 
the activity under federal guidelines, or having the federal regulation 
preempt state law.70  These permissible federal intrusions into areas of state 
governance must be kept in mind when assessing the commandeering or 
preemptive effect of H.R. 23.  
The Court elaborated on the constitutional limits examined in New York 
when it decided Printz v. U.S. a short time later.71  The Court held that the 
Brady Act’s requirement that local Chief Law Enforcement Officers (CLEOs) 
perform background checks of prospective gun purchasers was 
unconstitutional.72  Building upon the New York holding, the Court stated 
that Congress cannot circumvent the prohibition on compelling states to 
implement federal regulatory programs by instead directly conscripting state 
officers to administer the federal regulatory programs.73  The Court found 
this provision of the Brady Act extended beyond the constitutional power 
granted to Congress by the Necessary and Proper Clause.74  
The principles established in New York and Printz were subsequently 
discussed and applied in Reno v. Condon.75  Condon analyzed whether a federal 
statute that banned state DMVs from disclosing and selling personal 
information without the consent of the driver violated previously stated 
principles of federalism.76  The Court found the statute in question to be a 
valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority because it did not 
require the state legislature to enact any laws, nor did it require State 
officials to assist in the federal regulation of private individuals.77  The Court 
also addressed the distinction between unconstitutional laws that regulate 
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the states exclusively, and permissible laws of general applicability, which 
apply the duty to citizens as well as states.78  The decision reasoned that the 
statute regulated the “universe of entities” that took part in the market in 
question, the DMV disclosure and sale of information and its use by private 
parties in commerce.79  General applicability will add yet another layer of 
analysis to the validity of H.R. 23 provisions in addition to the anti-
commandeering principles of New York and Printz.   
The cases discussed above provide a lens through which to view the 
possible federalism violations of H.R. 23.  The Court’s interpretations in New 
York, Printz, and Condon define the limits of the federal government’s ability 
to compel state action.  Alternatively, the Supremacy Clause allows federal 
law to preempt contrary state law, blocking state action on an issue.80  
Whether provisions of H.R. 23 compel state action or prohibit California 
from administering its own laws will be a key inquiry in assessing the 
validity of the statute.   
Application of Federalism Principles to H.R. 23 
California’s sovereignty is challenged when H.R. 23 specifically 
references operation of the SWP.  The SWP operates exclusively within 
California’s borders and is managed by state agencies.  Section 108, 
discussed at length above, provides multiple instances of Congress dictating 
how the SWP shall be operated.81  Section 108 positively mandates operation 
of SWP in accordance with the Bay-Delta Agreement.  Congress is requiring, 
via federal legislation, the SWRCB to operate a state project in accordance 
with a specific regulatory framework.  The question is whether the 
Agreement qualifies as a federal regulation, similarly to the LRWAP the New 
York Court cited as intruding on New York state sovereignty.82  It could be 
argued that by referencing a previous agreement between the state and 
federal authorities, H.R. 23 effectively adopts the Agreement’s regulations 
and standards into its text.  There is no practical difference between the 
external reference and the regulations being printed directly within Section 
108.  It would follow that Section 108’s mandate compels a state agency to 
adopt and implement federal regulations in operation of a state project, 
running afoul of the principles set forth in New York and Printz.  
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Considering the principles set forth in New York, Printz and Condon, it is 
less clear how negative federal mandates for states fit into the anti-
commandeering analysis.  While there is certainly federal authority to 
preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause, the anti-commandeering 
cases present potential limits to Congress’ ability to prohibit state activity.  
Section 108 prohibits any California agency from restricting the exercise of 
any water rights obtained pursuant to state law to “protect, enhance, or 
restore under the Public Trust Doctrine any public trust value.”83  The Public 
Trust Doctrine (PTD) states that certain resources are inherently preserved 
for the public use, and therefore government owns and has a duty to protect 
such resources in the name of the public trust.84  The California Supreme 
Court embraced the PTD in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, requiring 
State agencies to consider trust values before approving water diversions.85  
Diverting water from a natural water course requires an affirmative act, as 
the water of the Delta does not naturally flow into the CVP or SWP.  By 
prohibiting the state from “restricting the exercise of an appropriative water 
right,” Section 108 is in effect compelling the state to make water deliveries 
in accordance with federal regulations.  The federal regulations in this 
instance do not recognize the public trust values central to California water 
policy.   
The uncertainty in applying the anti-commandeering and supremacy 
principles to negative mandates also impacts the public’s ability to be 
informed of regulatory decisions.  New York discusses the negative effect 
commandeering has on electoral accountability.86  When state officials must 
regulate an affirmative act at the direction of the federal government, they 
are potentially subjected to the brunt of public discontent over legislation 
they did not create.87  The opinion describes how preemption in “full-view” 
can properly direct electoral repercussions toward federal lawmakers.  If 
California officials are prohibited from implementing the PTD in water use 
decisions, thus increasing diversions under the guidance historically unclear 
water rights, will it be clear to California citizens which authority made the 
decision?  It seems the New York Court was referencing just such a scenario 
when it discussed the purpose of anti-commandeering principles.  
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In summation, H.R. 23, as currently written, poses multiple challenges 
to California’s ability to regulate state water resources in an environmentally 
protective manner.The statute includes numerous “clear Congressional 
directives” that aim to supplant state water law under the Court’s California v. 
U.S. holding.  This analysis will depend on the type of water right that is 
subject to the Congressional directive.  The state can arguably retain control 
over proprietary rights, whereas a Congressional directive can control 
allocation decisions.  Another Supreme Court prism of analysis focuses on 
H.R. 23 provisions that remove agency discretion to a point where ESA 
consultation is not required.  The Court’s Home Builders decision does not 
precisely define the boundaries between discretionary and nondiscretionary 
actions.  A strong argument can be made that any trace of agency discretion 
sustains the consultation requirement, and such an argument is warranted 
when viewing sections of H.R. 23.  Lastly, the anti-commandeering rules 
established by past Court decisions provide another framework for analyzing 
the validity of H.R. 23.  The statute appears to push the bounds of 
Congressional authority over state activities, hovering around the 
uncertainty between compelled state action and inaction.  
H.R. 23, regardless of its final form or enactment, represents a threat 
to California’s ability to implement its laws regarding state water resources.  
This paper has sought to provide a platform upon which the statute can be 
analyzed.  The lengthy document surely presents more opportunities for 
dissection than this brief paper covers.  Issues of federalism will surely 
predominate the discussion surrounding environmental management and 
sustainable resource use as California moves forward in the Trump Era.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
